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In this work we present the first distributed storage system that is prov-
ably robust against crash failures issued by an adaptive adversary, i.e., for
each batch of requests the adversary can decide based on the entire system
state which servers will be unavailable for that batch of requests. Despite
up to γn1/ log logn crashed servers, with γ > 0 constant and n denoting the
number of servers, our system can correctly process any batch of lookup
and write requests (with at most a polylogarithmic number of requests
issued at each non-crashed server) in at most a polylogarithmic number
of communication rounds, with at most polylogarithmic time and work at
each server and only a logarithmic storage overhead.
Our system is based on previous work by Eikel and Scheideler (SPAA
2013), who presented IRIS, a distributed information system that is prov-
ably robust against the same kind of crash failures. However, IRIS is only
able to serve lookup requests. Handling both lookup and write requests
has turned out to require major changes in the design of IRIS.
1 Introduction
One of the main challenges of a distributed system is that it is able to work correctly
even if parts of the system fail to work. If a server experiences a crash failure it
becomes unavailable to the other servers, i.e., it does not issue or respond to requests
any more. Crash failures can be temporary or permanent, and if it is temporary, a
server may either be back to its state when it crashed, or it may have lost all of its state.
We will focus on crash failures where, whenever a server becomes available again, it is
back to its state when it crashed. This is a reasonable assumption since for commercial
servers it is extremely rare that their state cannot be recovered. However, a temporary
∗This work was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) within the Collab-
orative Research Center “On-The-Fly Computing” (SFB 901) and by the EU within FET project
MULTIPLEX under contract no. 317532.
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unavailability is not that uncommon and can have many causes such as maintenance
work, hardware or software glitches, or denial-of-service attacks. Especially denial-of-
service attacks can be a serious threat because they are normally unpredictable, hard
to prevent and they can cause the unavailability of a server for an extended period of
time.
Predominant approaches in information and storage systems to deal with the threat
of crash failures are to use redundancy: information that is replicated among multiple
machines is likely to remain accessible even if some servers are unavailable. Unfortu-
nately, in systems that consist of thousands of servers a complete replication of the
data over all servers is not feasible. Hence, one needs to find an appropriate tradeoff
between the amount of redundancy and the number of crashed servers the system can
handle. One can easily show that if Θ(log n) copies of a data item are placed randomly
among n servers, and these random positions are not known to the adversary, then
any strategy of the adversary that blocks half of the servers will not block all of the
copies, with high probability1. The situation is completely different, however, when
considering an adaptive adversary, i.e., someone who has complete knowledge about
the system.
In a previous work, Eikel and Scheideler [7] presented a distributed information sys-
tem, called IRIS, that just needs a constant storage redundancy in order to be robust
against an adaptive adversary that can crash up to Θ(n1/ log logn) servers. Unfortu-
nately, the system lacks the important ability to handle write requests, i.e., to add,
remove and update data items. This work solves this problem.
1.1 Model and Preliminaries
We assume that the storage system consists of a static set S = {s1, . . . , sn} of n reliable
servers of identical type. The servers are responsible for storing the data as well as
handling the user requests. We assume that all data items are of the same size, and
that any data item d is uniquely identified by a key key(d). The universe of all possible
keys is denoted by U , andm := |U | is assumed to be polynomial in n. Furthermore, we
assume that the size of the data items is at least Ω(log n logm). There are two types
of user requests: lookup(k) for k ∈ U , and write(k, d) for k ∈ U and a data item d. The
user can issue a request by sending it to one of the servers in S. Given a lookup(k)
request, the system is supposed to either return the data item d with key(d) = k, or
to return NULL if no such data item exists. Given a write(k, d) request, the system is
supposed to store data item d with key k such that subsequent lookup(k) requests can
be answered correctly. Note that with a write(·) request the user can also update or
remove data.
Every server knows about all other servers and can therefore directly communicate
with any one of them. This does not endanger scalability since millions of IP addresses
can easily be stored in main memory in any reasonable computer today and we assume
the set of servers to be static. We use the standard synchronous message passing model
1“With high probability”, or short, “w.h.p.”, means a probability of at least 1 − 1/nc where the
constant c can be made arbitrarily large.
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for the communication between the servers. That is, time proceeds in synchronized
communication rounds, or simply rounds, and in each round each server first receives
all messages sent to it in the previous round, processes all of them, and then sends
out all messages that it wants to send out in this round. Note that assuming the
synchronous model is just a simplification and that our protocols only require the
message delays to be bounded. In addition, we use the synchronous model because
describing all protocols in an asynchronous setting would significantly blow up the
construction and would hide the main innovations behind our system. We assume
that the time needed for internal computations is negligible, which is reasonable as the
operations in the protocols we describe are simple enough to satisfy this property.
For the crash failures, we assume a batch-based adaptive adversary. This means the
following: We assume that time is divided into periods consisting of a polylogarithmic
number of rounds. The adversary has complete knowledge of the current system, but
cannot predict the (future) random choices of the system. Based on his knowledge,
he can select an arbitrary set of O(n1/ log logn) servers to be crashed. A server that
is crashed will not send any message nor react to messages sent from other servers.
We assume that the servers have a failure detector that allows them to determine
whether a server is crashed so that statements like “if server i is crashed then . . . ”
are allowed in the protocol. Note that assuming bounded message delays, failure
detection can simply be implemented using timeouts. After that, the adversary may
issue an arbitrary collection of requests to the system by sending up to ω ∈ N lookup(·)
requests and up to ω write(·) requests to each server. In order to keep the presentation
of RoBuSt as clear as possible, throughout this work we assume ω = 1. RoBuSt can in
principle handle arbitrary values of ω, but in that case the bound on the work required
by each server for serving all requests must be multiplied with ω.2 There are no further
limitations, i.e., the keys selected by the adversary may or may not be associated with
data items stored in the system, and the adversary is also allowed to issue multiple
lookup requests for the same key. The task of the system is to correctly handle all
of these requests. We assume that any period is long enough such that the system
has enough time to perform all necessary computations and to answer all requests.
After any period, the adversary may select a different set of Θ(n1/ log logn) servers to
be crashed. We assume that the set of crashed servers does not change during a fixed
period, which is why we use the notion of a batch-based adaptive adversary. Of course,
allowing crash failures at arbitrary times would make the model much stronger, yet it
would significantly complicate the system design, which is why we leave this to future
research. Note that we assume links between intact (i.e., non-crashed) servers to be
reliable. Unreliable links can be dealt with using, for example, at-least-once delivery
or error correction strategies, which are out of scope for our design since it is already
complex enough.
In order to measure the quality of the storage system, we introduce the following
notation. A storage strategy is said to have a redundancy of r if r times more storage
(including any control storage) is used for the data than storing the plain data. We
2Note that our system would not be able to answer all requests with at most polylogarithmic work
if ω > polylog(n), but this would trivially hold for any storage system.
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call a storage system scalable if its redundancy is at most polylog(n), efficient if any
collection of lookup and write requests specified by the adversary can be processed
correctly in at most polylog(n) many communication rounds in which every server
sends and receives at most polylog(n) many messages of at most polylog(n) size, and
robust if any collection of lookup and write requests specified by the adversary can
be processed correctly even if a set of up to Θ(n1/ log logn) servers specified by the
adversary crash.
1.2 Related Work
Over the past years, distributed storage systems have gained a lot of importance.
Popular examples include the storage solutions offered by Google, Apple, or Amazon.
Since availability and retrievability of the stored data is a key aspect of distributed stor-
age systems, these systems should be able to work correctly despite common failures.
Often failures in distributed systems are divided into the following types [5]: crash
failures, omission failures, timing failures, and Byzantine failures. In crash failures the
affected component (for instance a server) completely stops working. In receive (send)
omission failures the affected component cannot receive (send) any further messages.
A timing failure leads a component to not respond within a specified time interval.
In case of a Byzantine failure, the affected component may react in an arbitrary, even
malicious manner.
This work focuses on crash failures. Many works dealing with crash failures in dis-
tributed systems focus on crash failure recovery and crash failure detection [15, 12, 8].
But to the best of our knowledge, no previous work has considered how to secure a
distributed storage system against many (e.g., more than a polylogarithmic number)
simultaneous crash failures controlled by an adaptive adversary while using only poly-
logarithmic work, time and redundancy. That is, we do not seek to prevent failures or
attacks, but rather focus on how to maintain a good availability and performance even
in spite of them. Our system is based on the distributed hash table (DHT) paradigm
(e.g., [3, 6, 9, 14, 16]), with the additional twist of using coding and arranging the used
DHTs in an appropriate structure. Various systems based on DHTs that are resistant
against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks (which represent a special type of crash fail-
ures) have already been proposed [10, 11, 13]. But these do not work for adaptive
adversaries. The first DHTs that are robust against past insider crash failures were
proposed in [1, 2], where a past insider only has complete knowledge of the information
system up to some past time point t0. For this kind of insider, it is possible to design an
information system so that any information that was inserted or last updated after t0 is
safe against crash failures [1, 2]. But the constructions proposed in these papers would
not work at all for a current insider because they are heavily based on randomization
to ensure unpredictability. Eikel and Scheideler were the first to present a distributed
information system, called IRIS, that is provably robust even against a current insider
that crashes up to Θ(n1/ log logn) servers. The authors showed that IRIS can correctly
answer any set of lookup requests (with one request per server that is not crashed)
with polylogarithmic time and work at each server and only a constant redundancy.
Still it remained open whether it is possible to design a distributed storage system that
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can efficiently handle lookup and write requests under the presence of crash failures.
We answer this question positively by proposing such a system.
1.3 Our Contribution
We present the first scalable distributed storage system, called Robust Bucket Storage
(in short RoBuSt), that is provably robust against adaptive crash failures and that
supports both lookup and write requests. Concretely, we allow the adversary to have
complete knowledge about the storage system and to have the power to crash any set
of γn1/ log logn servers, for γ > 0 constant. The task of the system is to serve any
collection of lookup and write requests in an efficient way despite the crash failures.
RoBuSt expands some of the ideas in IRIS, a distributed storage system that we
proposed in SPAA 2013 [7]. The system presented in this work tolerates a number of
crashed servers that is similar to the number of servers blocked by a DoS attack that
the Basic IRIS version can tolerate and achieves comparable efficiency bounds (up to
a logarithmic factor). In contrast to IRIS, which can only handle lookup requests,
RoBuSt is able to additionally handle write requests. Although in the lookup protocol
we are able to adapt some of the underlying ideas of IRIS, adding the write functionality
required significant changes in the whole structure. To simplify the description for
readers who are familiar with IRIS, we try to re-use terminology whenever there are
similarities (e.g., Probing Stage, Decoding Stage).
One aspect is that IRIS organizes data into layers of n data items each, and each
layer is encoded separately using distributed coding that involves all n servers. This
means that whenever a data item needs an update, all n servers have to update their
information for the corresponding layer. Since we allow any set of write requests, it
may happen that every write request involves a different layer, which would create
an enormous update work. To solve this issue, in RoBuSt we store the data items in
so-called buckets that are organized in a binary tree. For each data item, there are a
logarithmic number of buckets that are a potential storage location for the data item.
For a data item there may exist different versions of it in different buckets. But our
system ensures that the highest bucket (i.e., the bucket with minimum distance to the
root in the underlying binary tree over the buckets) that contains a version of the data
item always holds the most recent version.
Furthermore, IRIS uses a fixed set of hash functions to specify anchor locations
for the data so that afterwards lookup requests can be served efficiently despite an
adversarial DoS attack. However, using fixed hash functions in RoBust would enable
the adversary to annul the fair distribution of data in a bucket. Therefore, RoBuSt
chooses new, random hash functions whenever write requests have to be served.
Another complication is the fact that a server may not know whether its information
is up-to-date. This is because at the time when write requests were executed that re-
quired an update in that server, the server might have been crashed. Our organization
of the data and our protocols ensure that any server that answers a request always
returns the most recent version of a data item.
Nevertheless, RoBuSt makes sure that all data can still be efficiently found while
the storage overhead is at most a logarithmic factor.
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Theorem 1.1. RoBuSt is a scalable and efficient distributed storage system that only
needs a logarithmic redundancy to protect itself against batch-based adaptive crash fail-
ures in which up to γ · n1/ log logn servers can crash for a constant γ > 0, w.h.p.
2 Underlying Datastructure
In the following, we assume keys are potentially from an address space of size at
most np, i.e., we need Λ := p log n bits for each address. We introduce the following
definitions: For a data item d, denote the address of d by key(d) = dp logn−1 . . . d1d0 ∈
{0, 1}p logn and let bitd(i) := di.
Our data structure is based on a binary tree with Λ + 1 levels, so-called zones. We
denote the nodes of each zone as buckets where each bucket will hold a set of data
items. The internal storage strategy of the buckets is described in Section 2.1. Zone
0 consists of a single bucket, bucket Bε. Each bucket B that is not in zone Λ has
two children, denoted by 0-child(B) and 1-child(B). For each data item d there is
not only a single possible bucket in which to store d but there are Λ + 1 possible
buckets for d, one in each zone. Bucket Bε may hold any data item. Any data item d
that may belong to bucket B in zone `, may also belong to 0-child(B) if bitd(`) = 0
or to 1-child(B) if bitd(`) = 1. In the following, let B be the set of all buckets and
let bucket(z, d) : {0, . . . ,Λ} × U → B be a function that returns the unique possible
bucket of a data item d at zone z. Initially, a bucket does not contain any data. During
the runtime of the system the following invariant is satisfied: Each bucket, excluding
bucket Bε, stores either 0 or between n and 2n data items. Bucket Bε stores at most
2n data items.
2.1 Internal Storage Strategy of the Buckets
The idea of storing a set D of data items into a bucket B is to reuse the basic concepts
of the storage strategy for individual layers from IRIS [7]. Roughly speaking this
strategy works as follows: In order to achieve the desired robustness, we first create
c ≥ 18 logm pieces d1, . . . , dc for each data item d ∈ D using Reed Solomon coding.
Using c hash functions chosen uniformly and independently at random, these pieces
are then mapped to servers. Finally, all these pieces are encoded with each other, such
that at the end each intact server holds for each piece some parity information resulting
from the encoding process. Besides encoded data pieces each bucket B additionally
stores c hash functions and a timestamp t(B). The timestamp is used to handle out-
dated information a server might hold if it has crashed in a previous period in which
write requests were served.
In the following we roughly describe the coding strategy presented in [7]. The
coding strategy is a block-based distributed strategy that follows the topology of a
k-ary butterfly as described in the following. For k ∈ N we use the notation [k] =
{0, . . . , k − 1}.
Definition 2.1. For any d, k ∈ N, the d-dimensional k-ary butterfly BF (k, d) is a
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graph G = (Vk, E) with node set Vk = [d+ 1]× [k]d and edge set E with
E = {{(i, x), (i+ 1, (x1, . . . , xi, b, xi+2, . . . , xd))}
| x = (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ [k]d, i ∈ [d], and b ∈ [k]}.
A node u of the form (`, x) is said to be on butterfly level ` of G. Furthermore, LT (u)
is the unique k-ary tree of nodes reached from u when going downwards the butterfly
(i.e., to nodes on butterfly levels `′ > `) and UT (u) is the unique k-ary tree of nodes
reached from u when going upwards the butterfly. Moreover, for a node u at level `,
let BF (u) be the unique k-ary sub-butterfly of dimension ` ranging from butterfly level
0 to ` in BF (k, d) that contains u.
A visualization of a k-ary butterfly is given in Figure 1.
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
000
001
002
010
011
012
020
021
022
100
101
102
110
111
112
120
121
122
200
201
202
210
211
212
220
221
222
Figure 1: Visualization of a k-ary butterfly BF (k, d) for k = d = 3. For a better
readability most of the edges from level two and three are omitted. The
dashed box denotes the sub-butterfly BF ((2, 111)). The thick solid lines in
the dashed box denote the edges of UT ((2, 111)). The thick dotted lines
denote the edges of LT ((2, 121)).
In the following let BF (k, d) be a k-ary butterfly with n = kd and with server si,
i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, emulating the butterfly nodes (0, i), . . . , (d, i). That is, whenever a
butterfly node (j, i), j ∈ {0, . . . , d} is supposed to perform an action or store data, this
is done by server si. We say a server s is connected via the k-ary butterfly to another
server s′, if there is an edge (u, v) in the butterfly such that u is emulated by s and v
is emulated by s′.
While in IRIS each server holds O(1) data pieces per layer, in our system each
server holds O(log n) data pieces per bucket. This is due to the fact that each bucket
contains O(n) data items and for each data item c = Θ(logm) pieces are created and
distributed evenly among the servers. Hence, we simply concatenate the data pieces a
server si holds in a bucket B and denote the resulting data block as bi.
In order to encode the data blocks b0, . . . , bn−1 assigned to the servers s0, . . . , sn−1
in bucket B, initially, bi is placed in node (0, i) for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Given
that in butterfly level ` we have already assigned data blocks d(`, x) to the nodes
(`, x) we use the coding strategy presented in [7] to assign data blocks d(` + 1, x) to
the nodes at butterfly level ` + 1. The used coding strategy is based on some simple
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parity computations and ensures the following property: If at most one butterfly node
(` + 1, xj) from the set of nodes {(` + 1, x1), . . . , (` + 1, xk)} is crashed, then the
information in the remaining nodes (` + 1, xi), i ∈ {1, . . . , k}\{j}, suffices to recover
d(`, x1), . . . , d(`, xk). Furthermore, with Lemma 2.4 in [7] the storage amount of each
server si, i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, required for the encoding of a single bucket is upper
bounded by (1 + e)z, where z denotes the maximum size of the data blocks stored at
any server sj , j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. Since there may exist outdated data items in the
system, but for each level at most one, i.e. in total at most Λ + 1 = O(log n) many for
each data item, the redundancy of our system increases to O(log n).
Corollary 2.2. RoBuSt has a redundancy of O(log n).
3 The Write Protocol
In the following let D with |D| ≤ (1 − δ)n and δ < 1/72 · n1/ log logn, be the set of
data items for which intact servers received write requests. For a data item d that is
stored in the system denote the c pieces that have been created from d using Reed
Solomon coding as d1, . . . , dc. Furthermore, denote the server that is holding d1 (after
the pieces have been spread over the n servers) as the server maintaining d.
3.1 Preprocessing Stage
In this stage, for each crashed server si, a unique intact server is determined, denoted
as the representative of si, such that at the end of this stage each crashed server is
the representative of at most two other servers. The idea of the representatives is to
let them take over the roles of the according crashed servers in actions (e.g. routing,
computations) the crashed servers were supposed to perform. For this, we additionally
need to ensure that each intact server knows the representatives of all crashed servers
it is connected to in the underlying k-ary butterfly.
The determination of the representatives and the introduction of the representatives
to the appropriate servers can be done in the same manner as in the butterfly completion
stage of [7], which can be carried out in (2 + o(1)) log n rounds with a congestion of at
most O(log n) (see Lemma 2.11 in [7]). In contrast to [7], we do not need to compute
a so-called decoding depth here that gives information about the minimum level of the
butterfly that the decoding must be initiated from, which would take O(log n) rounds.
In the following, we denote by s(i) the representative of si if si is crashed or si itself
otherwise.
3.2 Writing Stage Overview
In order to keep the specification of our system simple, we first give a high-level
overview of how a set of write requests is handled. Further details are given in the
following subsection.
The Writing Stage consists of up to Λ + 1 phases. Each phase z ∈ {0, . . . ,Λ} deals
with a single bucket Bz from zone z only and receives a set of data items Dz to be
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inserted into Bz. At the beginning, D0 := D is the set of all data items for which
there are write requests. In the following, D(Bz) denotes the set of data items that
are stored in bucket Bz (at the beginning of phase z). Phase z ∈ {0, . . . ,Λ} consists
of the following steps.
1. Completely decode Bz and send all decoded pieces of a data item d ∈ D(Bz) to
the server maintaining d (for details, see the appendix).
2. If |D(Bz)∪Dz| ≤ 2n: Add the data items from Dz to D(Bz), choose c new hash
functions h1, . . . , hc : U → V uniformly at random for Bz, and reencode Bz (see
appendix and below).
3. Else (|D(Bz) ∪Dz| > 2n):
a) The intact servers agree on a subset Dz+1 ⊆ D(Bz) ∪ D of size n with
the property that for all d, d′ ∈ Dz+1, bitd(z) = bitd′(z) = b ∈ {0, 1} (for
details, see the appendix).
b) Reencode the data items in (Dz ∪ D(B)) \Dz+1 in bucket Bz and
choose c new hash functions h1, . . . , hc : U → V uniformly at random for
Bz. (see below)
c) Set Bz+1 :=0-child(Bz+1) if b = 0 and Bz+1 :=1-child(Bz+1) if b = 1 and
propagate the data items in Dz+1 to the next phase (for details, see the
appendix).
Each phase of the Writing Stage can be performed in O(log n) rounds with a con-
gestion of O(log n) at each server in each round (see appendix). Since there are at
most O(log n) phases in the Writing Stage, the overall runtime is O(log2 n) rounds.
3.2.1 Encoding of a Bucket
In the following we describe how a set of data items is reencoded into a bucket, as
required in step 2 and step 3b. Note that the reencoding of a bucket does not only
consist of the simple encoding of the data items belonging to that bucket but it consists
of some additional steps, as described in the following.
First, in contrast to IRIS, s(1) chooses c hash functions h1, . . . , hc : U → V uniformly
at random that will be used to map data pieces of this bucket to servers. While in
IRIS the hash functions that map data pieces to servers are never changed, we need
to choose new hash functions for a bucket B whenever B is (re)encoded. The reason
for this is that otherwise the adversary would be able to generate write requests that
overload certain servers.
Note that the hash functions need to satisfy certain expansion properties, but if
c is chosen sufficiently large (c ≥ 18 logm) they do so, w.h.p. (more information is
provided in the appendix). After that, s(1) distributes the c hash functions to all other
intact servers s(i). This distribution can be realized by simply broadcasting the hash
functions in the k-ary butterfly from level logk n to level 0. In addition, s1 distributes
a current timestamp t(Bz) to all other intact servers and each intact server s(i) sets its
current timestamp for bucket Bz to that value. Each server s(i) now creates for each
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data item which it maintains or which it has received write requests for and which are
not propagated to the next phase the c pieces d1, . . . , dc of d using Reed Solomon coding
(Section 2). Here, dj , j ∈ {1, . . . , c}, is supposed to be sent to the server s′ responsible
for hj(d) or to its representative if s′ is crashed. Unfortunately, a server s(i) does not
necessarily know the representative of the server s′ if that server is crashed. Thus,
instead of sending the data pieces directly, the servers initiate a bottom-up routing
in the underlying k-ary butterfly in order to determine the representative of hj(d) for
each 1 ≤ j ≤ c. Obviously, this takes only logk n rounds and can be performed with a
congestion of O(k) per node. Once s(i) knows the representative of hj(d), it directly
sends dj to hj(d) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ c.
After the pieces of data items have been distributed, the servers encode the data
items in (D(Bz)∪Dz)\Dz+1 in a distributed fashion. Note that the set of data blocks
for server i in zone z is completely overwritten for each server s(i) in this process. This
can be done by a simple top-down approach using the coding strategy for IRIS (see
Section 2.1 in [7]). In addition, we also store the timestamp of the bucket along with
the data block by appending it to the composed data block.
The following lemma holds during the encoding step, regardless of the current phase.
Lemma 3.1. Assume the adversary blocks less than (γ/2) · 2logk n servers, with γ =
1/36. Then, for any data item d that is (re-)written during the current period, and any
level 0 ≤ ` ≤ logk n, there are at most c/6 pieces of d that are mapped to sub-butterflies
BF (v) (for some v at level `) with at least d2`−1e crashed servers in BF (v), w.h.p.
Proof. In the following, we denote a sub-butterfly BF (v) for some v ∈ V at level ` as
blocked at level ` if at least d2`−1e servers in BF (v) are crashed (note that we need
the ceiling function only for the special case ` = 0). Let d be a data item, and let
0 ≤ ` ≤ logk n be a fixed level in the underlying k-ary butterfly. First of all, we show
that the fraction of blocked sub-butterflies at level ` is at most γ. Using the Chernoff
bounds [4], we can conclude from this that the number of pieces of d that are mapped
to blocked sub-butterflies are at most c/6 with high probability.
Recall that each sub-butterfly at level ` contains exactly k` servers. Obviously, for
` = 0, the fraction of crashed servers at level ` is upper bounded by γ/2 < γ. Thus, in
the following, we assume 1 ≤ ` ≤ logk n. Let b be the number of blocked sub-butterflies
at level `. Then, there exist at least b · 2`−1 crashed servers. On the other hand, the
adversary can block only less than γ/2 · 2logk n servers. Hence, b · 2`−1 < γ · 2logk n−1
which is equivalent to b < γ · 2logk n−`. Recall that there are exactly klogk n−` sub-
butterflies at level `. This yields that the fraction of blocked sub-butterflies at level `
is at most γ · 2logk n−`
klogkn−` ≤ γ. Using the Chernoff bounds it is easy to show that at most
c/6 pieces of d are mapped to a blocked sub-butterfly, w.h.p.
The lemma plays an important role in the proof of the correctness of the Lookup
Protocol.
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4 The Lookup Protocol
In order to keep the specification of our system simple, we provide the description of the
lookup protocol as a separate protocol that is executed after the execution of the Write
Protocol. The lookup protocol is divided into two stages: the Preprocessing Stage
(Section 4.1) and the Zone Examination Stage (Section 4.2). The former is similar to
the Preprocessing Stage of the Write Protocol (Section 3.1). The latter is performed
for each zone individually and split into two further stages: the Probing Stage and
the Decoding Stage. The basic idea of the Probing Stage is to answer a request by
directly collecting a sufficient number of data pieces. If this is not possible, either
because too many of the servers holding a piece are crashed or because of congestion,
the Decoding Stage tries to recover a data item by utilizing the distributed coding
described in Section 2.1. Note that both a Probing Stage as well as a Decoding Stage
can be found in IRIS ([7]), too. While they match in their general structure, there are
important differences that are caused by the differences in the underlying structure
and the implications of the write functionality. For example, servers may now store
obsolete data items without being aware of that.
4.1 The Preprocessing Stage
The Preprocessing Stage is exactly the same as in Section 3.1. If at least one write
request has been handled in the current period, we can thus skip this part and re-use
the established k-ary butterfly and the unique representatives.
4.2 The Zone Examination Stage
In the following let D be the set of data items for which a lookup request arrived at
an intact server. The idea of this stage is to successively perform a lookup for each
d ∈ D in each zone until a copy of d has been found and returned to the appropriate
server. The zone examination stage is performed for at most Λ + 1 zones starting with
zone 0.
In each phase z ∈ {0, . . . ,Λ}, beginning with z = 0, each server with an un-
served lookup request for some data item d initiates a lookup request for d in bucket
bucket(z, d). Any server that receives a copy of the data item it requested during the
lookup in zone z, as described in the following, returns that copy and is finished. All
remaining lookup requests are handled in the next phase, phase z := z + 1. This
procedure is repeated until each lookup request is served.
Handling a set of lookup requests in one phase z is done by performing the Probing
Stage and the Decoding Stage as described in the following.
4.2.1 Probing Stage
In the following let s be an intact server that has an unserved lookup request for a data
item d at the beginning of phase z. The idea of the Probing Stage is to either achieve
c/3 up-to-date pieces such that d can be recovered. Or to assign the request for d to a
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level {1, . . . , logk n} (as defined later) in order to further handle the request in the next
stage, the Decoding Stage. In the following, for a server s′, an index i ∈ {1, . . . , c},
and a data piece d′ we denote by Pi(s′, d′) the unique path of length logk n in the k-ary
butterfly from the butterfly node on level logk n emulated by s′ to the butterfly node
on level 0 emulated by the server that is responsible for hi(d′).
On a high level view, in phase z, server s performs the following steps.
1. Acquire current hash functions and timestamp td for bucket bucket(z, d).
2. Choose c intact servers s(d1), . . . , s(dc) uniformly and independently at random.
3. Send a probe(d, i, td) message to s(di), i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, in order to initiate the
forwarding of the probe(·) message along the c paths Pi(s(di), di).
Note that acquiring the hash functions in step 1 is necessary since s may have been
crashed in the last period in which a write occured in bucket bucket(Z, d) (at which the
hash functions were replaced). Acquiring the current hash functions and the timestamp
works as follows: First of all, s randomly chooses κ := Θ(log n) intact servers and asks
them for their timestamp in bucket bucket(Z, d). The intact servers can be found in
O(1) communication rounds, w.h.p., by selecting κ random servers in each round until
κ intact servers have been found. Let td be the maximum timestamp s received. If
td is greater than the timestamp s stores for bucket(Z, d), s knows that it does not
have the current hash functions and asks one server from which it received td for the c
hash functions for bucket bucket(Z, d). Note that during this process each server only
receives O(log n) requests throughout this process, w.h.p.
Once s knows the correct hash functions, its goal is to retrieve at least c/3 pieces of
d. Since contacting the servers holding the c pieces of d directly may cause a too high
congestion at these servers, we use the method of forwarding c probes from uniformly
chosen intact servers s(d1), . . . , s(dc) to the servers responsible for the c pieces of d
along the c paths P1(s(d1), d1), . . . , Pc(s(dc), dc) (step 2, step 3). Analogously to step 1
choosing the c intact servers in step 2 takes O(1) communication rounds, w.h.p.
In the following we describe how the nodes from the paths P1(s1, d1), . . . , Pc(sc, dc)
react on incoming messages during this phase. Let u be a butterfly node on level
` ∈ {0, . . . , logk n} that has received a probe(d, i, td) message. In order to reduce
redundancy u combines probes for the same piece of d (and thus the same target) and
u marks itself as the new origin of the probe (technique of splitting and combining
[7]). In the following we denote a butterfly node u as congested if it has received more
than α · c probe(·) messages for different probes, for a sufficiently large constant α > 0.
Whenever u receives a probe(d, i, td) message, u performs the following steps.
1. If u is congested:
2. Stop forwarding the probe and send a fail(d, i, `) message to the origin of
the probe message.
3. Else:
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4. If ` 6= 0: Forward probe(d, i, td) message to the butterfly node on level `− 1
on the path Pi(s(di), di).
5. If ` = 0: (probe has reached its destination)
6. If u’s current version of bucket bucket(Z, d) has timestamp td and the server
emulating u is not just a representative of u:
7. If u holds piece di of d: Send requested piece di to the origin of the
probe message.
8. Else: Send notexists(d) message to the origin of the probe message.
9. Else: Send fail(d, i, 0) to the origin of the probe message.
If a butterfly node on level ` ∈ {0, . . . , logk n − 1} receives a data item, a fail(·), or
a notexists(·) message, it forwards this answer to the origin of the request to which
this message was an answer to (along the same path that the request was routed). A
butterfly node on level logk n emulated by s(di), i ∈ {1, . . . , c}, that received an answer
for a probe for data piece di simply forwards this answer to the server that initiated
the forwarding of that probe. These answers ensure that after O(logk n) rounds the
server s that received a lookup request for a data item d has received for all initially
sent probe(·) messages a piece of d, or a notexists(d) message, or the level at which
the probing failed. Depending on which kinds of answers s has received, it reacts as
follows:
• If s received at least c/3 up-to-date pieces of d, s recovers d using Reed Solomon
coding and answers the request.
• Else if s receives a notexists(d) message, s answers that the requested data item
does not exist in the system.
• Else if s receives more than 2c/3 fail(d, i, 0) messages, s declares the request for
d to belong to level `, where ` ∈ {1, . . . , logk n} is the smallest level that contains
at least 5c/6 active probes for di, i.e., probes for di that successfully passed the
probing at level ` and all levels `′ > `.
It is easy to see that the Probing Stage takes at most O(log n) communication rounds
per phase with at most O(log2 n) congestion at every server in each round. Note that
if a data item belongs to a level `, then at least 5c/6 of its probes successfully pass
level ` and get deactivated later in the probing (i.e., in a level `′ < `). To this end,
each data item can either be retrieved successfully (this is the case if 5c/6 > c/3 pieces
pass level 0) or belongs to a level 1 ≤ ` < logkn.
For the proof of the correctness of the protocol, the following lemma plays an im-
portant role.
Lemma 4.1. If the adversary can only block less than (γ/2) · 2logk n servers, then
for every ` ∈ {1, . . . , logk n}, the number of data items belonging to level ` is at most
γn/k`−1 with γ = 1/36.
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The general idea and structure of the proof of Lemma 4.1 is based on the proof of
Lemma 2.16 in [7]. In contrast to [7], the only level at which requests are aborted due
to crashed nodes is level 0. In addition, we also have to take into account that nodes
may store outdated information because they were blocked at the round in which new
data was written. Besides this, we have a different definition of when a node belongs
to level ` here (we require at least 5c/6 active probes instead of c/2) and a different
value of γ.
In order to prove Lemma 4.1 we need to introduce the following definitions:
Definition 4.2 (Congested sub-butterfly). Let v be a node at level ` in the butterfly.
The sub-butterfly BF (v) is called congested at level ` if the servers in BF (v) receive
more than k`αc/2 probes for different di pieces in total when the requests are processed
at level `.
Definition 4.3 (Congested data item). A data item d is called congested at level `
if there exist congested sub-butterflies BF (s(`1)i1 (d)), . . . , BF (s
(`r)
ir
(d)) with li ≥ ` − 1,
r = c/6, and i1, . . . , ir being pairwise different.
As a crucial ingredient for the proof of Lemma 4.1, we require the hash functions
h1, . . . , hc to satisfy a certain expansion property, which holds if the hash functions are
chosen uniformly and independently at random, w.h.p.. For this, we need the following
definitions.
Definition 4.4 (b-bundle). Given a set S ⊂ U of keys and a k ∈ N, we call F ⊆
S × {1, . . . , c} a b-bundle of S if every d ∈ S has exactly b many pairs (d, i) in F .
Definition 4.5 ((b, σ)-expander). For any sub-butterfly B let V (B) be the set of
servers emulating the nodes of B. Let H be a collection of hash functions h1, . . . , hc.
Given h1, . . . , hc and a level ` ∈ {0, . . . , logk n}, we define ΓF,`(S) :=
⋃
(d,i)∈F V (BF (s
(`)
i (d))).
Given a 0 < σ < 1, we call H a (b, σ)-expander if for any 0 ≤ ` < logk n, any S ⊆ U
with |S| ≤ σn/k`, and any b-bundle F of S, it holds that |ΓF,`(S)| ≥ k`|S|.
The following Claim can be proven analogously to Claim 2.13 of [2].
Claim 4.6. If the hash functions H = {h1, . . . , hc} are chosen uniformly and in-
dependently at random, m = |U | sufficiently large, and c ≥ 18 logm, then H is a
(c/6, 1/36)-expander, w.h.p.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: For the proof, we distinguish between level 1 and all other
levels ` > 1. To simplify, whenever we say that a piece di of a data item d is aborted
at level `, we mean that the probing for di did not successfully pass level ` (but was
answered with a fail(d, i, `) message). Recall that there are two reasons for a request
for a piece di to be aborted: Either due to an excessive congestion (at any node at
level ` > 0) or because the server responsible for di is crashed or outdated (at level 0).
Note that whenever a data item d belongs to level 1, then more than 3c/6 of the
c pieces of d must have been aborted at level 0 due to outdated or crashed nodes at
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level 0 (5c/6 pieces of d successfully passed level 1 by the definition of when a data
item belongs to level 1 and if at least c/3 pieces would have passed level 0 successfully,
the data item would have been answered already). First of all, Lemma 3.1 yields that
at most c/6 of the c pieces of any data item can have been aborted at level 0 due
to outdated nodes. Thus, for any data item d belonging to level 1, more than c/6
pieces of d must be aborted at level 0 due to crashed nodes. We will now bound the
maximum number of these data items. Let S be a maximum set of data items that
belong to level 1. We will show: |S| < γn. We now construct a set F in the following
way: for each d ∈ S, we choose c/6 indices i with the property that di is aborted at
level 0 due to crashed nodes and add these (d, i) to F . Note that F is a c/6-bundle F
of S. Since the adversary can block only less than γn servers, the number of servers
covered by all BF (s(0)i (d)) with (d, i) ∈ F is less than γn. Since ΓF,0(S) is exactly
the set of these servers, it holds: |ΓF,0(S)| < γn. On the other hand, we know from
Claim 4.6 that for any c/6-bundle F ′ of S′ with |S′| ≤ γn, |ΓF ′,0(S′)| ≥ |S′|. Note
that this also implies that for any c/6-bundle F ′ of S′ with |S′| ≥ γn, |ΓF ′,0(S′)| ≥ γn.
Now, assume for contradiction that |S| ≥ γn. This yields |ΓF ′,0(S′)| ≥ γn. Since this
is a contradiction to what we said before, |S| < γn must hold and thus the number of
data items belonging to level 1 must be bounded by γn.
Next, for any level ` > 1, we bound the number of data items belonging to level
`. First of all, note that the only reason for a piece of data item to be aborted on
a level ` ≥ 1 is due to congestion at a node at level `. Second, note that it can be
shown that whenever a probe(d, i, td) is aborted on level ` ≥ 1 due to congestion, then
BF (s
(`)
i (d)) is congested w.h.p. (see Claim 2.18 of [7]). Thus, whenever a data item
d is declared to belong to a level ` > 1, then at least c/6 probe(d, i, td) messages have
been deactivated at level ` − 1 or higher because of congested sub-butterflies, i.e. d
is congested at level ` − 1 (see Def. 4.3). Thus, if many data items belong to level `,
then many sub-butterflies must be congested at level `− 1. However, as we will prove,
only a constant fraction of the sub-butterflies can be congested at level ` − 1, which
implies that only a constant fraction of all data items can belong to level `.
Fix 1 < ` ≤ logk n. As mentioned before, we will now bound the number of data
items that are congested at level ` − 1. Let S be a maximum set of data items that
are congested at level ` − 1. We will show: |S| < γn/k`−1. Again, we construct
a c/6-bundle F of S (adding, for each d ∈ S, c/6 indices i to F with the property
that BF (s(li)i (d)) is congested). We first show that for α sufficiently large, less than a
fraction of γ of all butterflies at level `−1 can be congested. Recall that a sub-butterfly
on level `− 1 is congested if it receives more than αck`−1/2 probes for different (d, i)-
pairs. Let δ be the maximum fraction of servers the adversary may block. Since there
are at most (1− δ)n lookup requests in total, at most c(1− δ)n probes arrive at level
` − 1. Thus, at most c(1 − δ)n/(αck`−1/2) = 2(1 − δ)n/(αk`−1) sub-butterflies can
be congested at level ` − 1. Since there are exactly n/k`−1 disjoint sub-butterflies at
level `− 1, the fraction of congested sub-butterflies at level `− 1 is upper bounded by
2(1− δ)/α ≤ 2/α. Hence, for α > 2/γ, less than a γ-fraction of the sub-butterflies on
level `− 1 can be congested. That is, all of the congested sub-butterflies BF (s(li)i (d))
with (d, i) ∈ F together contain less than a γ-fraction of the sub-butterflies on level
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`− 1. This implies |ΓF,`−1(S)| < γn.
On the other hand, from Claim 4.6, we can deduce that for any c/6-bundle F
of S′ with |S′| ≥ γn/k`−1, |ΓF,`−1(S′)| ≥ γn. By assuming for contradiction that
|S| ≥ γn/k`−1, we can deduce that |ΓF,`−1(S)| ≥ γn, which is a contradiction in this
case, too. Thus, |S| < γn/k`−1.
Therefore, less than γn/k`−1 are congested at level ` − 1. For the remaining data
items, at least 5c/6 pieces are not congested. Thus, these data items do not belong to
level `. This finishes the proof.
4.2.2 Decoding Stage
The Decoding stage proceeds in logk n sub-phases. In the following, for a server s that
holds a lookup request for some data item d that has not been answered before this
sub-phase, we define s(`)i (d) as the node at level ` on the unique path of length logk n
from the butterfly node on level logk n emulated by si(d) to the butterfly node on level
0 responsible for hi(d).
On a high level view, the Decoding Stage works as follows: During each sub-phase
1 ≤ ` ≤ logk n, starting with level 1, we try to recover the data items belonging to
level `. In order to recover a data item d, we need to collect at least c/3 pieces of d.
To do so, we randomly choose 5c/6 requests for pieces of d that were active at level `
in the Probing Stage and for each of these pieces di we determine whether BF (s
(`)
i (d))
can be decoded without congestion (as described later). If BF (s(`)i (d)) can be decoded
without congestion, the decoding is initiated and the result of this is sent back to the
origin. (Throughout the whole process, we use the same combining/splitting approach
of messages as in the Probing Stage.) Otherwise, the origin is informed that the
according piece of d could not be decoded. If for a data item d not sufficiently many
(i.e., less than c/3) pieces could be recovered, the request for d is declared to belong
to level ` + 1 and will be considered again in the next sub-phase. Note that requests
for non-existing data items may be handled in the Decoding Stage. However, these
can be treated as existing items (with the only difference being that one intact server
taking part in the decoding is sufficient to tell that the data item does not exist).
In the following, we describe the operation of any sub-phase ` in more detail. First of
all, each server s that is responsible for a lookup request of a data item d that belongs
to level ` chooses 5c/6 among the at least 5c/6 indices of pieces of d that were active
at level ` in the Probing Stage. For such a piece di of d with current timestamp t, s
sends a decode(d, i, t) message from s(logk n)i (d) to v := s
(`)
i (d) (which is done by simply
routing through the k-ary butterfly into the direction of hi(d) for ` rounds). In order to
determine whether BF (v) can be decoded without congestion, v first checks whether
it is congested, i.e., it received more than βck decode(·) messages for a sufficiently
large constant β and, if not, then issues a decodeCHECK(d, i) message, which is spread
to all nodes in UT (v). During this spreading, whenever a further forwarding of all
messages received by a node u at a level ` − κ, 1 ≤ κ < `, could lead to congestion
(i.e., u received more than βck decodeCHECK(d′, i′) messages for distinct (d′, i′) pairs),
u stops the forwarding of all messages and instead spreads a cong(·) message in BF (u).
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In addition, it sends a fail(·) message to all neighbors at level `− κ+ 1. Each node on
a level `′, `− κ+ 1 ≤ `′ < `, that receives such a fail(·) message forwards this message
to all neighbors at level `′ + 1 from which it received a decodeCHECK(·) mesage. By
this it is ensured that whenever a node in BF (u) is congested each node v′ at level `
with v′ ∈ BF (u) receives a fail(·) message after at most 2` rounds. Each node u′ at
level ` − κ, 1 ≤ κ < `, that received a cong() message initiates the same spreading of
cong() messages in UT (u′). If v had not been congested before the spreading and v
has not received any fail(·) message after 2` rounds, it knows that any piece of a data
item for which v received a decode(·) message can be decoded if not outdated nodes
in BF (v) forbid this. Thus, it initiates the decoding for each of the pieces, which may
fail due to outdated nodes. If the decoding is possible, it recovers all of these pieces
within O(`) communication rounds with a congestion of at most βck2 per node (using
the distributed decoding described in [7]). These are then forwarded to the origins of
the requests. If, however the decoding fails, or if v was congested or received a fail(·)
message, it sends a fail(·) message to the origins of the decode(·) messages it received
(which, again, are forwarded up to the initiator of that decode(·) message). Finally,
if a server s that is responsible for a lookup request of a data item d receives at least
c/3 successfully decoded pieces, it determines d and answers the request. Otherwise,
it changes the request to belong to level ` + 1 such that it will be processed again in
the next sub-phase.
It is easy to see that the Decoding Stage satisfies the following property:
Lemma 4.7. The Decoding Stage takes at most O(log n) communication rounds per
sub-phase with at most O(log3 n) congestion in every node at each round, w.h.p.
Similarly to Lemma 4.1 of the Probing Stage, for the Decoding Stage the following
lemma holds:
Lemma 4.8. At the beginning of each sub-phase ` ∈ {1, . . . , logk n}, the number of
data items with requests belonging to level ` is at most ϕn/k` with ϕ = Θ(k).
For the proof of Lemma 4.8 we need the following definitions:
Definition 4.9 (Blocked sub-butterfly). Let v be a node at level ` in the butterfly.
The sub-butterfly BF (v) is called blocked at level ` if at least 2`−1 servers from BF (v)
are crashed.
Definition 4.10 (Congested sub-butterfly). Let v be a node at level ` in the butterfly.
The sub-butterfly BF (v) is called congested at level ` if the servers in BF (v) receive
more than βck requests for different di pieces in total when the requests are processed
at level `.
Definition 4.11 (Blocked/Congested data item). A data item d is called
blocked/ congested at level ` if there exist blocked/congested sub-butterflies
BF (s
(`1)
i1
(d)), . . . , BF (s
(`r)
ir
(d)) with li ≥ `, r = c/6, and i1, . . . , ir being pairwise dif-
ferent.
Furthermore, we need the following claims.
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Claim 4.12. For any data item d which is neither blocked nor congested, at most c/6
pieces of d can fail due to outdated servers.
Proof. Assume a data item d is neither congested nor blocked. This means that
less than c/6 pieces of d are congested and less than c/6 pieces of d are blocked.
The latter implies that the adversary blocks less than 2`−1 servers from the sub-BFs
BF (s
(l1)
i1
(d)), BF (s
(l1)
i1
(d)), . . . for the remaining pieces di1 , di2 , . . . of d. By Lemma 3.1,
for all but c/6 of these pieces, less than 2`−1 of the servers inBF (s(l1)i1 (d)), BF (s
(l1)
i1
(d)), . . .
can be outdated regarding d. Thus, for all but c/6 of these pieces, less than 2`−1 +
2`−1 = 2` servers can be crashed or outdated, which, by Claim 2.17 of [7] means that
these pieces can be recovered. Thus, at most c/6 pieces of the data items that are
neither blocked nor congested can fail due to outdated servers.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma 4.8. The proof is similar to the proof of
Lemma 2.21 of [7] with the main difference being that we additionally need to handle
outdated data items here.
Proof of Lemma 4.8: In the following, let γ = 1/36 and ϕ = 3γk. We prove the
lemma by induction on `. The basis (` = 1) holds by Lemma 4.1. For the induction
step, let ` ∈ {1, . . . , logk n − 1} and assume that the induction hypothesis holds for
level `. We show that the number of data items that will be propagated to level `+ 1
during sub-phase ` is at most 2γn/k`. Together with Lemma 4.1, this means that at
the beginning of sub-phase ` + 1, at most γn/k` + 2γn/k` data items belong to level
`+ 1, which is equal to ϕn/k`+1 and thus proves the induction step.
Recall that in sub-phase `, requests for 5c/6 pieces of each data item belonging to
level ` are sent. Note that any request for a piece di of a data item d in sub-phase ` of
the Decoding Stage can only be aborted for one of the following three reasons: First,
that too many servers storing information about di are crashed in the current period.
Second, that too many servers storing information about di are outdated (i.e., they
were crashed when the bucket storing d was last updated). Third, due to congestion
in sub-phase ` of the Decoding Stage. However, it can be shown that if at least c/6
requests for a data item d are aborted during the decoding in sub-phase ` due to too
many crashed nodes, then d is blocked at level ` and if at least c/6 requests for a
data item d are aborted during the decoding in sub-phase ` due to congestion, then
d is congested at level ` w.h.p. The former claim is an implication of Claim 2.17 of
[7], and the latter follows by definition and the algorithm performed in the decoding
stage. Claim 4.12 now implies that for the data items which are neither blocked nor
congested, at least 5c/6 − c/6 − c/6 − c/6 = c/3 pieces can be recovered correctly,
which means that they can be answered after sub-phase `. Thus, in the following, we
will show that at most γn/k` data items are blocked at level ` and that at most γn/k`
data items are congested at level `.
First of all, we prove that the number of blocked data items in sub-phase ` is upper
bounded by γn/k`. Let S be a maximum set of data items that are blocked at level
`. We will show: |S| < γn/k`. Recall that a data item d is blocked at level ` if there
exist at least r = c/6 sub-butterflies BF (s(`1)i1 (d)), . . . , BF (s
(`r)
ir
(d)) with `i ≥ `, and
18
i1, . . . , ir being pairwise different that are blocked, i.e., each of them contains at least
2`i−1 crashed servers. For each d ∈ S, let di1 , . . . , dir be c/6 such indices fulfilling
this property. Further, let (d, di1), . . . , (d, dir ) ∈ F for all d ∈ S. Then, F is a c/6-
bundle of S. Since a sub-butterfly of level `′ contains k`
′
servers in total, and since
a blocked sub-butterfly of level `′ contains at least 2`
′−1 crashed nodes, a 2`
′−1/k`
′
fraction of the servers of a blocked sub-butterfly of level `′ are crashed, which is at
least 2logk n−1/n for any 1 ≤ `′ ≤ logk n. Therefore, if the adversary can only block
less than (γ/2) · 2logk n servers, then the number of servers covered by all BF (s(`i)i (d))
with (d, i) ∈ F must be less than γn. Since ΓF,`(S) is exactly the set of these servers,
it holds: |ΓF,`(S)| < γn.
On the other hand, we know from Claim 4.6 that for any c/6-bundle F ′ of S′ with
|S′| ≤ (1/36)n/k`, |ΓF ′,`(S′)| ≥ |S′|k`. Since γ = 1/36, this implies that for any c/6-
bundle F ′ of S′ with |S′| ≥ γn/k`, |ΓF ′,`(S′)| ≥ γn. Now, assume for contradiction
that |S| ≥ γn/k`. This yields |ΓF,`(S)| ≥ γn, which is a contradiction to what we said
before. Hence, the number of blocked data items at level ` is less than γn/k`.
For the upper bound on the number of congested data items, recall that we denote a
sub-butterfly BF (v) of a node v as congested if the servers in BF (v) receive more than
βck decode messages for different (d, i)-pairs. For β := 3, it holds that βck > 5ϕc/(6γ),
which implies that a congested sub-butterfly BF (v) of a node v receives more than
5ϕc/(6γ) decode(d, i, t) messages for different d and i. By the induction hypothesis
and due to the fact that we send 5c/6 decode(·) messages per data item, there are at
most 5c/6 · ϕn/k` decode(·) messages in total, which means that there are less than
ϕn/k` · 5c/6 · 6γ/(5cϕ) = γn/k` congested sub-butterflies of dimension `.
Let S be a set of data items congested at level `. Similar to the previous part
about blocked data items, we can construct a c/6-bundle F for S. Since there are
less than γn/k` congested sub-butterflies of dimension ` and since each sub-butterfly
of dimension ` contains k` nodes, |ΓF,`(S)| < γn. On the other hand, if we assume
|S| ≥ γn/k`, Claim 4.6 yields |ΓF,`(S)| ≥ γn. Since this is a contradiction, we have
that the nummber of data items congested at level ` is less than γn/k`.
As stated at the beginning of the proof, this is sufficient to prove the induction step
and thus completes the proof of the lemma.
The previous lemmas and results imply Corollary 4.13, which proves Theorem 1.1.
Corollary 4.13. RoBuSt correctly serves any set of lookup and write requests (with
one request per intact server) in at most O(log4 n) communications rounds, with a
congestion of at most O(log3 n) at every server in each round and a redundancy of
O(log n) if less than 1/72 · n1/ log logn servers are crashed.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the first scalable distributed storage system that is provably robust
against batch-based crash failures with up to γn1/ log logn crashes allowed (γ > 0
constant). An interesting question that has not been investigated in this work is
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whether the techniques that enabled the Enhanced IRIS system [7] to tolerate a larger
number of failed servers could be adapted for RoBuSt in order to increase the number of
crashed servers allowed up to %n (for some constant % > 0) while (as a minor drawback)
also increasing the redundancy to O(log n), such as it is the case in Enhanced IRIS.
Moreover, while we assume batch-based failures, it would be interesting to see
whether a scalable distributed storage system can be designed that can tolerate fail-
ures occuring at arbitrary points in time. Dealing with a similar issue, it would also be
interesting to enhance our system to allow dynamics (i.e. joins and leaves of servers)
in our system in order to model P2P networks.
A further interesting challenge is to enhance our distributed storage system such
that additional types of attacks can be handled, for example Byzantine attacks.
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Appendix
5.1 Details on Decoding
At the beginning of each phase of the Writing Stage, for each data item d belonging to
the current bucket Bz, all pieces of d are decoded and sent to the server maintaining d.
This can be done by a bottom-up approach that proceeds in logk n+ 1 rounds: First
of all, note that for each bucket, each server stores the timestamp of when it last took
part in a Writing Stage for this bucket. These timestamps enable a server to identify
that it stores outdated information about a bucket.
In round r ∈ {0, . . . , logk n−1}, each node u at level logk n−r in the k-ary butterfly
forwards all decoding information about a node v at level logk n − r − 1 to v. In
any round r′ ∈ {1, . . . , logk n} any crashed node v at level logk n − r′ filters out all
messages whose timestamp is not a highest among those received and, if the number
of remaining messages is at least k − 1, it can use these messages to decode enough
information to function as an intact node from now on. Note that if v received a
timestamp higher than its own one, it behaves like a crashed one from now on.
Any node w at level 0 that is still crashed after round logk n − 1 can restore the
pieces of data items in w by the messages it receives from the nodes at level 1. This is
due to the following: First of all, the adversary can block less than 12 · 2logk n servers
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in the current period only. Secondly, less than 12 · 2logk n servers can store outdated
information about bucket Bz, for the same reason. Thus, less than 2logk n servers can
have none or outdated pieces of data items. Then, from Claim 2.17 of [7] it follows
that all pieces can be recovered at level 0.
Note that the c hash functions for the pieces of a data items were been chosen
uniformly and independently at random when Bz was encoded, and after the adversary
had decided on the set of blocked servers. Thus, each server holds O(log n) pieces for
bucket Bz, w.h.p. Furthermore, each server maintains at most one data item, w.h.p.
This implies that the above process yields a congestion of at most O(log n) w.h.p.
All in all, we have:
Lemma 5.1. After logk n+ 1 rounds with a congestion of O(log n) at each server in
each round w.h.p., each server s(i) maintaining a data item d in Bz completely knows
d, w.h.p.
5.2 Details on Counting and Selection
In the following we describe the process of determining the number of data items in
D(Bz)∪Dz and the elements of the setDz+1 (if necessary) for a phase z in a distributed
fashion in more detail. For the set Dz of data items to be inserted into Bz, we denote
by Dz,i ⊆ Dz the set of data items with a write request at server s(i). Furthermore,
we denote by Bz,i ⊆ D(Bz) the set of data items from bucket Bz that server s(i)
maintains.
First of all, each server s(i), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} initializes a tuple (num0, num1) where
numj , j ∈ {0, 1}, is the number of data items d ∈ Bz,i ∪ Dz,i with bitd(z + 1) = j.
These tuples are now forwarded bottom up in the underlying k-ary butterfly, where
each intermediate node sums up all tuples it received and forwards the result to the
next smaller level. More precisely, each server s(i) first sends its tuple (num0, num1) to
each of the k neighbors of the node (logk n, i) in the underlying k-ary butterfly. Any
intermediate node v on level `, 0 < ` < logk n, sets numj , j ∈ {0, 1}, as the sum of all
k received numj-values and sends the tuple (num0, num1) to its k neighbors on level
` − 1 in the underlying k-ary butterfly. Finally, a server s(i) on level 0, sums up all
tuples received from neighbors on level 1 and stores the result in (num′0, num′1). The
following lemma is easy to check.
Lemma 5.2. After logk n rounds, each server s(i) knows the number of data items
d ∈ D(Bz) ∪Dz with bitd(z + 1) = j for all j ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, in every round,
each server s sends and receives at most 2k messages.
The servers can now compute size(Bz) := num′0+num′1 and check whether size(Bz) >
2n. If this is not the case, the current bucket is reencoded together with the items from
Dr (see Section 3.2.1) and the Writing Stage finished. Otherwise the servers need to
degree on the bucket and a set Dz+1 of n data items from D(Bz)∪Dz to be handled in
the next phase. Whether this bucket is either 0-child(Bz) or 1-child(Bz) depends on
the number of data items with the same (z+ 1)-st bit in Dz ∪D(Bz). I.e., if num′0 > n
the next bucket is Bz+1 :=0-child(Bz) and we set j := 0, otherwise the next bucket
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is Bz+1 :=1-child(Bz) and we set j := 1. Then, since size(Bz) > 2n, num′j > n must
hold.
In the following, the servers determine the set Dz+1 of n data items that will be
propagated to bucketBz+1, as required in step 3c. This is done by a top-down approach
in the tree LT ((0, 0)) of the k-ary butterfly. In the following, we assume that each
node v in LT ((0, 0)) during the first part (the bottom-up counting) stored the tuples
(t1,0, t1,1), (t2,0, t2,1), . . . , (tk,0, tk,1) it received from its children v1, . . . , vk in LT ((0, 0))
and is now still able to determine the value of ti,j , i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Furthermore, the
nodes exchange two different types of messages during this step: full and partly(x),
x ∈ N. At the beginning, (0, 0) issues partly(size(Bz)) on itself. Depending on the
message a node v receives, it performs the actions described in the following.
partly(x): If v is not on level logk n, let v1, . . . , vk denote the children of v in LT ((0, 0)).
Determine the greatest index b such that y ≤ x with y := ∑bi=1 ti,j . Send full to
v1, . . . , vb. If x− y > 0, send partly(x-y) to vb+1. If v is on level logk n, the server
emulating v randomly chooses x data items d ∈ Bz,i ∪Dz,i with bitd(z + 1) = j.
These data items belong to Dz+1 and will be handled in the next phase as if the
server emulating v has a new write request for them.
full: If v is not on level logk n, v sends a full-message to each of its children in LT ((0, 0)).
If v is on level logk n, the server emulating v removes all data items d ∈ Bz,i∪Dz,i
with bitd(z + 1) = j. These data items belong to Dz+1 and will be handled in
the next phase as if the server emulating v has a new write request for them.
The following lemma is easy to check:
Lemma 5.3. After logk n additional rounds it holds:
1. Each server s(i) knows which of the data items in Bz,i ∪Dz,i are supposed to be
encoded in bucket Bz again and which of them are propagated to the next phase.
2. In every round, each server s sends and receives at most 2k messages.
3. The number of data items that are decided to belong to bucket Bz (and thus will
be encoded in this bucket) is at most 2n.
It remains to distribute for each data item from Dz+1 a write request among the n
servers such that each server s(i) is responsible for exactly one of these write requests.
This distribution can easily be achieved by using standard techniques for load balancing
in the butterfly in O(log n) rounds and a congestion of O(log n) at each server.
5.3 Figures & Glossary
Figure 2 and Figure 3 visualize the Probing and Decoding Stage.
Table 1 provides an overview of the variables and terms used in this work and their
meanings.
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Figure 2: Visualization of the Probing Stage. The curved paths denote the paths
Pi(s(di), di).
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Figure 3: Visualization of sub-phase ` of the decoding stage
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Variables
and Terms
Meaning and Notes
n number of servers in the system
m size of universe of all possible keys, polynomial in n
c set to value ≥ 18 logm which is the number of pieces into which
each data item is split before encoding it with RS codes
k set to O(log n), system uses k-ary butterfly as underlying topology
γ set to 1/72 and used in the term γn1/ log logn that denotes the
maximum number of crashed servers allowed
p positive constant in term p log n which is the length of an address
Λ set to p log n which is the length of an address
γn1/ log logn upper bound for the number of crashed servers the system can tolerate
logk n depth of the underlying k-ary butterfly
c/3 number of pieces of a data item needed to recover that data item
βck2 maximum congestion at each intact server in each round
of the decoding stage
5c/6 number of pieces of a requested data item to proceed with
in the decodings tage
Table 1: Variables and terms used in this work and their meanings
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